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Case No. 20030453-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for forgery and fraudulent handling of 
recordable writings, both third degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to dismiss the 
forgery charge where the jury could have reasonably found that 
defendant signed the trust deed purporting to act for Baca Enterprises 
with the intent to defraud either Baca Enterprises, the title insurance 
company, or the lender? 
"The grant or denial 'of a motion to dismiss is a question of law [that this Court] 
review[s] for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court.'" State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ f 179 70 P.3d 111 (citation omitted). 
II. Does defendant's unpreserved claim that Ted Baca's subsequent 
signing of the deed "purged" his actions of fraud fail where defendant 
does not cite any authoritative criminal law on point? 
Because defendant did not raise this claim below, it is reviewed, if at all, only for 
plain error. To establish plain error, defendant must show that (1) an error occurred; (2) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error was prejudicial. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
III. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's Shondel request to be 
charged with one of two lesser crimes where the crime of fraudulent 
handling of recordable writings requires proof of elements not required 
for the lesser crimes and more specifically addresses defendant's 
criminal conduct? 
A trial court's application of the Shondel doctrine is reviewed "'under a 
correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to the trial court's 
ruling.'" State v. Green, 2000 UT App 33, \ 5, 995 P.2d 1250 (quoting State v. Kent, 945 
P.2d 145, 146 (Utah App. 1997)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes, relevant to this appeal, are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) (Forgery); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503 (1999) (Fraudulent handling of 
recordable writings); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 (1999) (Written false statements); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-511 (1999) (Falsification or alternation of 
government record). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged by information with one count each of forgery 
and fraudulent handling of a recordable writing, both third degree felonies, and one count 
each of writing a false statement and falsification of government records, both class B 
misdemeanors (R. 1-3). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on all 
charges (R. 39-41). 
On October 25, 2002, the information was amended to charge only forgery and 
fraudulent handling of records (R. 51-52, 95-96). 
Before trial, defendant moved to dismiss each of the remaining counts (R. 56-59, 
66-69, 69-72). After the State's case-in-chief at trial, defendant argued his motions and 
the trial court denied them (R. 143:307-329). Defendant also moved to substitute lesser 
offenses for the fraudulent handling charge under Shondel (R. 66-69; R. 143:319). The 
court deferred ruling on that motion until the parties discussed jury instructions (R. 
143:319). At the close of evidence at trial, defendant renewed his Shondel motion (R. 
143:485). After noting that the motion had been discussed in great length in chambers, 
the trial court denied it (R. 143:486). The jury then convicted defendant as charged (R. 
97, 112; R. 144:543). Defendant's subsequent motion to set aside the verdicts was denied 
(R. 144:549). 
Defendant was sentenced to zero-to-five years in prison and fined $9,250 on each 
count (R. 122-27). The court suspended defendant's prison terms and placed him on 
eighteen months probation (R. 122-27). 
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Defendant timely appealed (R. 128-31). The record does not indicate the results of 
the State's subsequent motion for restitution (R. 134-38, 139-40). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On July 2, 2001, Baca Enterprises, as Lessor, entered into a lease agreement (the 
"lease" or "lease agreement") with Pacific Nakon International, Inc. ("Pacific Nakon")2 
as Lessee. The lease agreement allowed Pacific Nakon to develop certain Baca 
Enterprises property adjacent to Zion National Park in southern Utah (R. 142:108, 117; R. 
143:243, 342-44; Exh. 1 (attached at Addendum B)). Ted Baca signed three copies of the 
lease as president of Baca Enterprises (R. 142:107, 117;R. 143:244; Exh. 1). Defendant 
signed the copies both individually and as president, CEO, and majority shareholder of 
Pacific Nakon (R. 142:107, 117; R. 143:333; Exh. 1). Defendant retained two copies of 
the lease (R. 143:404). Ted Baca retained one copy (R. 143:404). None of the copies 
was notarized (R. 142:106; R. 143:243, 350). 
Paragraph 16 of the lease addressed Pacific Nakon's ability to secure debt against 
the leased property (Exh. 1). That paragraph provided: 
Subordination. Upon request by Lessee, Lessor shall subordinate its 
interest in and to the Property to such construction and development 
loans, mortgages, promissory notes, and deeds of trust arising from, 
or related to, Lessee's development of the Property, and shall 
1
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. 
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, If 2, 6 P.3d 1116. 
2Although this entity is identified as Pacific Nacon in the record transcripts, 
defendant's brief identifies the company as Pacific Nakon International, Inc. See Aplt. 
Br. at 7. The State refers to the company as it has been identified by defendant. 
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execute all documents required by such lenders or financial 
institutions, subject, however, to a maximum combined limit of no 
more than $500,000.00 and to a limitation of no more than 12 
months from the date hereof (or until July 1, 2002) that Lessor's 
position will be so subordinated. 
(Exh. 1). 
Before the lease was executed, defendant had already negotiated the terms of a 
promissory note in the amount of approximately $235,000.00 against the lease property 
(R. 142:120; Exh. 2 (attached at Addendum C)). The promissory note was to be secured 
by a trust deed executed by defendant and Baca Enterprises (Exh. 2). 
Shortly after the lease was executed, defendant realized that the signatures on the 
lease had to be notarized before the lease could be recorded with the county recorder's 
office (R. 143:351, 402). Defendant called Ted Baca and his wife Cecilia to arrange for 
the lease to be re-signed and notarized (R. 143:352, 403). A meeting for that purpose was 
arranged for July 5, 2001, with John Reese, a notary at a local bank (R. 143:186-87, 243, 
353-54). 
At the July 5 meeting, defendant provided the notary page for John Reese to use in 
notarizing the leases (R. 143:353-54, 416). Reese made copies of the notary page and 
then completed a notary page for each of the three original leases (R. 143:192-93). 
Defendant then retained his two copies of the lease (R. 143:404). 
The notary page defendant provided Mr. Reese on July 5 was actually the notary 
page prepared for the trust deed (R. 142:74; R. 143:202, 416). However, defendant 
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neither informed the Bacas of the trust deed, nor did he ask Ted Baca to sign the trust 
deed on Baca Enterprises' behalf (R. 143:245, 406). 
Rather, after he received the notary pages for his two copies of the lease, defendant 
executed the trust deed three times: once individually, once on behalf of Pacific Nakon, 
and once on behalf of Baca Enterprises (R. 143:366-67; Exh. 2). Next to his signature on 
behalf of Baca Enterprises, defendant wrote, "See lease" (R. 143:367; Exh. 2). Defendant 
then recorded a copy of the notarized lease and a copy of the trust deed (R. 143:305-07, 
359). The documents were recorded within one and a half hours of the meeting with Mr. 
Reese on July 5 (R. 142:106, 125; R. 143:415). The last page of the trust deed consisted 
of one of the notary pages John Reese had completed for the lease (R. 142:73; R. 
143:195, 246; Exh. 2). 
Once the documents were recorded, defendant delivered them to Brad Adair at 
Southern Utah Title Company, who had been contacted by the attorney for the lenders 
under the promissory note to issue title insurance to protect the note (R. 143:208-09, 210-
11, 384). Adair then contacted the lenders' attorney and informed him that everything 
was in order to fund the loan against the Baca Enterprises property (R. 143:211; Exh. 5). 
Adair would not have issued the insurance policy without first having received the 
recorded trust deed (R. 143:214). 
Shortly after Adair called the attorney, the lenders forwarded the loan money to 
defendant (R. 142:75; R. 143:429-31). Defendant could not recall whether the loan 
money was deposited into Pacific Nakon's or his personal bank account (R. 143:430). 
6 
A few days later, Adair realized that the notary page on the trust deed did not 
match the signature page (R. 143:215-16). He thus called Ted and Cecilia Baca and 
requested a meeting with them (R. 143:217, 247, 293). At that meeting, Adair asked Ted 
Baca to sign the trust deed (R. 143:218, 247-48). After either Adair or Ted Baca, or both, 
spoke with Baca's attorney John Miles, Ted Baca signed the trust deed (R. 142:121-23; R. 
143:218-19, 249, 266, 295). According to defendant, he was not informed about the 
Bacas' meeting with Adair or about Ted Baca's decision to sign the trust deed (R. 
143:395). An affidavit signed by Adair explaining Ted Baca's execution of the trust deed 
was then recorded at the county recorder's office (R. 143:214, 220; Exh. 3). 
At trial, defendant claimed he believed he had authority to execute the trust deed 
on Baca Enterprises' behalf under ffl[ 6 and 16 of the lease (R. 143:368, 381, 386, 408, 
431). He claimed he did not know that the notary page from the lease was attached to the 
trust deed when he recorded it (R. 143:360, 365, 386, 425, 434). He testified that the 
notary page must have been attached to the deed by mistake either by one of the female 
employees in Adair's office, where he had stopped to sign the deed before recording it, or 
by the female who recorded the documents at the county recorder's office (R. 143:356-57, 
360, 363, 365, 425, 428). 
Concerning defendant's first claim, Ted Baca testified in the State's case-in-chief 
that he never authorized defendant to sign a trust deed for Baca Enterprises (R. 143:245, 
251). In addition, the Bacas' attorney, John Miles, testified in the State's case-in-chief 
that If 6 of the lease agreement was never intended to grant defendant a power of attorney 
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for Baca Enterprises concerning the lease property (R. 142:136). In fact, f| 12 and 16 of 
the agreement specifically required the Lessee to obtain the Lessor's signature for any 
development applications or loans (R. 142:137-38, 153-54). Finally, Miles testified that 
he expressly told defendant before the lease was executed: "If you go borrow money 
against their property, you're going to have to get them to sign whatever it is" (R. 
142:150). 
Concerning defendant's second claim, two female employees in Brad Adair's 
office and the female who recorded the documents in the county recorder's office all 
testified in rebuttal that a mistake as defendant described was highly unlikely (R. 143:442, 
447-48,451,455-56,466). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
dismiss the forgery count at the end of the State's case-in-chief. Defendant argues first 
that the State failed to prove that he acted with the intent to defraud. He argues second 
that, as a matter of law, a person does not commit forgery if he signs his own name. 
In the State's case-in-chief, the State presented evidence that defendant did not 
have authority to sign a trust deed for Baca Enterprises and that he nonetheless did so and 
presented the deed to a title insurance company and a lender to secure a $235,000 loan 
without Baca Enterprises' knowledge. This evidence was sufficient to survive a motion 
to dismiss concerning defendant's intent to defraud. Thus, defendant's first argument 
fails. 
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Because defendant cites no legal authority for his second argument, it fails as 
inadequately briefed. 
Issue II, Defendant claims that the charges against him should have been 
dismissed because Ted Baca's subsequent ratification of the trust deed "purged" 
defendant of his fraudulent conduct. Because defendant did not preserve this claim below 
and does not argue plain error on appeal, this Court should not reach this claim. In any 
case, where defendant cites to neither the statutes under which he was convicted nor to 
any authoritative appellate decision in a criminal case to support his claim, he has not 
demonstrated error, let alone obvious error. 
Issue III. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
reduce the fraudulent handling of recordable writings charge under State v. Shondel. 
However, the Shondel doctrine only applies if the statute with the lesser penalty requires 
proof of the same elements as the greater charge. Here, fraudulent handling of recordable 
writings requires proof of two elements—that defendant acted with the intent to defraud 
and that the writing at issue is one for which the law provides public recording—not 
required under the two statutes cited by defendant. Thus, defendant's Shondel claim fails. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE FORGERY CHARGE WHERE THE 
JURY COULD HAVE REASONABLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT 
SIGNED THE TRUST DEED PURPORTING TO ACT FOR BACA 
ENTERPRISES WITH THE INTENT TO DEFRAUD EITHER BACA 
ENTERPRISES, THE TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, OR THE 
LENDER 
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict at 
the end of the presentation of evidence" because "the State failed to present a prima facie 
case for each element of the crime of forgery." Aplt. Br. at 11 (capitalization and holding 
omitted). Defendant contends first that the State failed to prove that, in signing the trust 
deed on the line reserved for Baca Enterprises, defendant "acted with the requisite intent 
to defraud." Aplt. Br. at 11. Defendant contends second that the State failed to prove that 
his signature on that line "purported] to be the act of another." Aplt. Br. at 16. 
Defendant's first contention fails because evidence of defendant's fraudulent 
intent was sufficient to let the issue go to the jury. Defendant's second contention fails as 
inadequately briefed where defendant provides no legal authority to support it. 
A trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict presents a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, \ 8, 988 P.2d 949. A 
trial court's interpretation of a statute also presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. State ex rel P.S., 2001 UT App 305, ^  10, 38 P.3d 303. 
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Utah's forgery statute provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud 
anyone,... he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or 
utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes or utters any writing so that the 
writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or 
utterance purports to be the act of another . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. 76-6-501 (1999). 
A. Evidence that defendant signed the deed on the line reserved for 
Baca Enterprises in a manner suggesting he had authority to do 
when he did not was sufficient to prove intent to defraud. 
Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted his directed verdict 
motion because u[t]he State has presented no evidence that [defendant] acted with any 
knowledge or intent to deceive or defraud any person or any entity whatsoever." Aplt. Br. 
at 15. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Defendant moved both for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-
chief and to set aside the verdicts after defendant was found guilty (R. 143:307-29; R. 
144:549). To the extent defendant challenges the trial court's mid-trial ruling, the only 
relevant evidence is that presented in the State's case-in-chief. See State v. Kihlstrom, 
1999 UT App 289, \ 9, 988 P.2d 949. To the extent defendant challenges the trial court's 
post-trial ruling, all evidence may be considered. See id. 
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In either case, "[t]his court will uphold a trial court's denial of [defendant's] 
motion . . . if, 'upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably 
drawn from it , . . . some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Kihlstrom, 1999 UT 
App 289, f 8 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)); see also State 
v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ f 13 n.2, 20 P.3d 300 (noting same standard of review applies to 
both motions). 
To convict a person of forgery, the State must prove that the person acted "with 
purpose to defraud" someone. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. "'Fraud' has been defined by 
the Utah Supreme Court as an intentional misrepresentation offered for the purpose of 
inducing reliance upon it to gain some advantage." State ex rel P.S., 2001 UT App 305, 
U 17, 38 P.3d 303. Thus, one acts with an '"intent to defraud5" when he acts with '"a 
purpose to use a false writing as if it were genuine in order to gain some advantage.'" 
State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. May, 461 P.2d 
126, 128 (Idaho 1969)). 
"[I]ntent is a state of mind generally to be inferred from the person's conduct 
viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances." Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, ^ 
10. Moreover, "[b]ecause of the difficulty of proving . .. intent in a prosecution for 
forgery, the quantum of evidence the State must produce before an inference of. .. intent 
will arise should not be unrealistically burdensome." Id. Lastly, '"a false writing has 
such an obvious tendency to accomplish fraud that the jury is warranted in inferring such 
12 
an intent from the mere creation of an instrument that is false.'" Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 
1216 (quoting May, 461 P.2d at 128). This is especially so where the person creating the 
falsity served to benefit from the act had it not been found out. Cf. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 
1216. 
Here, the State presented the following evidence of defendant's intent to defraud 
in its case-in-chief: 
1. On July 2, 2001, Baca Enterprises, as Lessor, entered into a 
lease agreement with Pacific Nakon,, as Lessee, which 
allowed Pacific Nakon to develop certain Baca Enterprises 
property (R. 142:108, 117; R. 143:243;Exh. 1). Ted Baca 
signed the lease as president of Baca Enterprises; defendant 
signed the lease both individually and as defendant and 
president and CEO of Pacific Nakon (R. 142:107, 117; R. 
143:244, 333; Exh. 1). 
2. Paragraph 16 of the lease provided: "Upon request by Lessee, 
Lessor shall subordinate its interest in and to the Property to 
such construction and development loans, mortgages, 
promissory notes, and deeds of trust arising from, or related 
to, Lessee's development of the Property, and shall execute 
all documents required by such lenders or financial 
institutions . . . . " (Exh. 1) (emphasis added).3 
3. Although the notary page subsequently provided by defendant 
to notarize the lease came from the trust deed, defendant 
neither informed the Bacas of the trust deed, nor asked Ted 
Baca to sign the deed on Baca Enterprises' behalf (R. 142:74; 
R. 143:202,245). 
3Although defendant claims that "the State's own witnesses established that" ^ 6 of 
the lease "contained an assignment of all the Bacas' interest in the leasehold estate," Aplt. 
Br. at 12-13, in fact John Miles, the Bacas' attorney, specifically testified that f 6 did not 
contain such an assignment (R. 142:136). 
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4. Defendant signed the trust deed in three places, including on 
the line reserved for Baca Enterprises (Exh. 2). 
5. Next to his signature on the Baca Enterprises line, defendant 
wrote, "See lease," (Exh. 2). 
6. Ted Baca testified that he never authorized defendant to sign 
a trust deed on Baca Enterprises' behalf (R. 143:245). 
7. Baca's attorney, John Miles, testified that he expressly told 
defendant before the lease was executed: "If you go borrow money 
against their property, you're going to have to get them to sign 
whatever it is" (R. 142:150). 
8. After defendant executed the trust deed on the line reserved 
for Baca Enterprises, defendant recorded the trust deed with 
one of the notary pages that was completed for the lease (R. 
142:73; R. 143:195, 246; Exh. 2). 
9. Defendant then presented the recorded trust deed and lease to 
the lenders' title company so that the company could issue a 
title insurance policy, as required by the lenders before they 
would release any funds (R. 143:208-09, 210-11). 
10. Based on receipt of these recorded documents, the title 
company informed the lenders' attorney that everything was 
in order to fund the loan against the Baca Enterprises property 
(R. 143:211; Exh. 5). 
11. Shortly thereafter, the lenders forwarded the loan money to 
defendant (R. 142:75). 
12. The title company would not have issued its policy without 
first having received the recorded deed (R. 143:214). 
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably find that defendant knew he lacked 
authority to sign any deed of trust on Baca Enterprises' behalf. The jury could also 
reasonably infer that, by signing the deed on the line reserved for Baca Enterprises, and 
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then writing next to his signature, "See lease," defendant intended to defraud both the title 
company and the lenders by implying that the lease gave him authority to sign for Baca 
Enterprises. The title company would not have issued the title insurance policy and, 
hence, the lenders would not have given defendant the loan, if they had realized Baca had 
not signed the deed. This is supported by the fact that Adair subsequently arranged for 
Baca to sign the trust deed. Finally, the jury could reasonably infer that, by not telling the 
Bacas of the trust deed, defendant intended to keep knowledge of it from them, and 
potentially use the loan proceeds for a purpose "to which he [was] not otherwise entitled," 
Aplt. Br. at 15, or at least without the Bacas' oversight. 
This evidence is sufficient to prove that defendant signed the trust deed on the line 
reserved for Baca Enterprises with "a purpose to use a false writing as if it were genuine 
in order to gain some advantage." Gonzalez, 822 P.2d at 1216 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, this evidence was sufficient to defeat defendant's 
motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-chief, and the trial court properly 
denied the motion. See Kihlstrorn, 1999 UT App 289,% 8. 
Furthermore, nothing in defendant's testimony or the State's rebuttal undermined 
the trial court's ruling. First, defendant admitted that he had the trust deed with him when 
he met with the Bacas on July 5 and yet never presented it to Ted Baca for his signature 
(R. 143:404, 406, 408). Second, although defendant testified that he believed he had 
authority to sign the deed for Baca Enterprises, see Aplt. Br. at 14-15, that testimony did 
not mandate a dismissal; rather, it merely created a disputed issue for the jury to decide. 
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See State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, If 11, 54 P.3d 645 ("'It is within the exclusive 
province of the jury to judge the credibility of the witness and the weight of the 
evidence."5) (quoting State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982)).4 Thus, the trial court 
did not err in denying defendant's motion to set aside the verdict at the end of trial. 
Finally, defendant argues that, to survive his motions, the State's evidence had to 
'" admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than of guilt.'" Aplt. Br. at 12 (quoting State v. 
Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983)). However, "the Utah Supreme Court has 
ruled that despite the existence of theoretically 'reasonable' hypotheses, it is within the 
province of the jury to judge the credibility of the testimony, assign weight to the 
evidence, and reject these alternative hypotheses." State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694-
95 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
B. Defendant's claim that forgery requires, as a matter of law, that the 
accused sign someone else's name fails as inadequately briefed. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his directed verdict motion 
because "[w]ith or without authority, the signing of his signature by Lamar Jensen could 
not purport to have been the act of a third person, the act of another, the act of Baca 
defendant's credibility was challenged not only by Ted Baca and John Miles' 
testimony concerning defendant's authority to sign for Baca Enterprises under the lease, 
but also by the State's rebuttal witnesses who severely undermined defendant's claim of 
innocence concerning how the trust deed was recorded with the improper notary page (R. 
142:150; R. 143:245, 251, 442, 447-48, 451, 455-56, 466). Against these witnesses' 
testimony, the jury could have reasonably rejected defendant's testimony concerning his 
lack of criminal intent. See Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, \U. 
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Enterprises, under any circumstance." Aplt. Br. at 16. This Court should reject 
defendant's claim as inadequately briefed. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's 
brief "shall contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Implicitly," this rule "requires not just bald citation to 
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). This Court "is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." 
State v. Horde, 2002 UT 4, \ 67, 57 P.3d 977, cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 257. 
Here, defendant provides no legal support for his claim. See Aplt. Br. at 16. 
Moreover, nothing in the plain language of the forgery statute requires that one must sign 
the name of another before he can be found guilty, nor has any Utah appellate court so 
held. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (providing person guilty of forgery if he "makes, 
completes, executes . . . any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution . . . purports to be the act of another"); State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317, 1317 
(Utah 1979) (holding only that "[o]r dinar ily, in proving the crime of forgery the state 
must show that the defendant not only used the name of another, but . . . that he did so 
without any authority so to do") (emphasis added); see also State v. Winward, 909 P.2d 
909, 912 (Utah App. 1995) (in case involving accused's signing another's name, citing 
Collins without noting its qualified reach); State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 
App. 1991) (in case involving accused's signing another's name, quoting Collins without 
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noting its qualified reach). As noted previously, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that, by signing his name on the line reserved for Baca Enterprises, and then 
adding, "See lease," defendant was purporting to act for Baca Enterprises. See pp. 14-15 
supra. In other words, even though defendant signed his own name, he did so under 
circumstances that suggested he was acting for another and that he had authority to do so, 
even though he did not. Thus, defendant's signature did purport to be the act of another. 
Because defendant has failed to adequately brief this claim, this Court should 
reject it. 
II. DEFENDANT'S UNPRESERVED CLAIM THAT TED BACA'S 
SUBSEQUENT SIGNING OF THE DEED "PURGED" HIS ACTIONS OF 
FRAUD FAILS WHERE DEFENDANT DOES NOT CITE TO ANY 
AUTHORITATIVE CRIMINAL LAW ON POINT 
Defendant claims that both his convictions must be reversed because Ted Baca's 
"subsequent signing of the deed purged [his] action of fraud." Aplt. Br. at 17. 
Defendant's unpreserved claim fails because he has not argued or established plain error. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claims.'" State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 
1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)); see 
also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tf 11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection at trial must "'be 
specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error . . . complained of,'" 
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting 
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Beehive Medical'Elecs., Inc. V. Square D. Co., 699 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983)), so that 
the court '"might have an opportunity to correct [it] if [the court] deems it proper,'" id, 
(quoting Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 
1974)) (second bracket in original). This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . 
unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11. 
Here, defendant raised his ratification defense only in closing argument to the jury 
(R. 144:535). Defendant never presented this claim as a basis for the trial court to grant 
his motion to dismiss or his motion to set aside the verdict (R. 56-57, 58-59, 69-72; R. 
143:307-29; R. 144:549). Thus, this claim was not preserved below. See Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, If 11; Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1144; Tolman, 912 P.2d at 460. Because defendant 
does not argue that plain error or exceptional circumstances justify review of this claim, 
this Court should not review it. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 
1995) ("Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' 
justifies a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on appeal."); see also Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, If 11. 
Even if this Court were to review this unpreserved claim, defendant cannot 
demonstrate plain error. To show plain error, defendant must show that (1) an error 
occurred; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error was 
prejudicial to defendant. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). As this 
Court has repeatedly held, "[t]o show obviousness of the error, [defendant] must show 
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that the law was clear at the time of trial" State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, \ 6, 18 P.3d 
1123; see also State v. Frausto, 2002 UT App 259, \ 22, 53 P.3d 486, cert denied, 63 
P.3d 104 (Utah 2002); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). 
Defendant cites only to two old civil cases recognizing that when a wronged 
person ratifies another's fraudulent execution of a contract, the contract becomes 
enforceable against the initially wronged person. See Aplt. Br. at 17-18; Pay son Bldg. & 
Loan Socyy v. Taylor, 87 Utah 302, 48 P.2d 894 (1935); Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 
P.2d56(1933). 
Defendant does not cite to either of the statutes under which he was convicted as 
requiring application of the common law civil rule he advocates to these crimes. See 
Aplt. Br. at 17-18. In fact, neither the forgery statute nor the fraudulent handling statute 
recognizes ratification as a defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (defining forgery); 
Id. § 76-6-503 (1999) (defining fraudulent handling of recordable writings). 
Moreover, defendant cites to no case, let alone a Utah case, applying the civil rule 
in a criminal context. See Aplt. Br. at 17-18. Nor has the State found one. See 37 C.J.S. 
Forgery § 86 (2003) ("Evidence of condonation or ratification is not admissible unless it 
tends to show & preexisting authority.") (emphasis added) (and cases cited therein); 
People v. Lucero, 623 P.2d 424, 427 (Colo. App. 1980) (noting "the general rule is that 
subsequent ratification constitutes no defense to crime"; rule's "basis lies in the 
understanding that crime affects the overall security of the citizenry, not merely the 
interests of the immediate parties" and "[satisfaction of the latter does not imply 
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preservation of the former"); State v. Warner, 564 N.E.2d 18, 50 (Ohio 1990) ("The 
overwhelming weight of federal and state authority has rejected the defense of subsequent 
ratification, whether express or implied, where criminal acts have been alleged"; see also 
cases cited therein); State v. Kelly, 396 S.E.2d 471, 474 (W.Va. 1990) (same) (and cases 
cited therein). 
In short, defendant has not shown that the trial court erred, let alone obviously 
erred, in not dismissing the charges against him despite evidence that Ted Baca 
subsequently ratified the deed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S SHONDEL 
REQUEST TO BE CHARGED WITH ONE OF TWO LESSER CRIMES 
WHERE THE CRIME OF FRAUDULENT HANDLING OF 
RECORDABLE WRITINGS REQUIRES PROOF OF ELEMENTS NOT 
REQUIRED FOR THE LESSER CRIMES AND MORE SPECIFICALLY 
ADDRESSES DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to reduce the 
fraudulent handling of records charge under the Shondel doctrine. Aplt. Br. at 19-21. 
Specifically, defendant argues that he should have been charged under one of two other 
statutes which, he claims, criminalize the same conduct as misdemeanors. Aplt. Br. at 19-
21. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Under State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969), and its progeny, 
Utah's courts "have held that where two statutes define exactly the same penal offense, a 
defendant can be sentenced only under the statute requiring the lesser penalty." State v. 
Bluff, 2002 UT 66, \ 33, 52 P.3d 1210, cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 999 (2003). 
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Thus, the Shondel doctrine "applies only when the two statutes address 'exactly the 
same conduct9" Id. (quoting State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986)). In other 
words, the doctrine only applies if the two statutes "have identical elements and prohibit 
exactly the same conduct." Id. "'[I]f the elements of the crime[s] are not identical and 
the relevant statutes require proof of some fact or element not required to establish the 
other, the statutes do not proscribe the same conduct and . . . [a defendant] may be 
charged with the crime carrying the more severe sentence.5" Hernandez, 2003 UT App 
276, f 8 (quoting State v. Green, 2000 UT App 33, If 6, 995 P.2d 1250) (brackets in 
original). 
Moreover, the Shondel doctrine does not alter the general rule that, "when an 
individual's conduct can be construed to be a violation of two overlapping statutes, the 
more specific statute governs." State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450, 451 (Utah 1984) (citing 
Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979), and Shondel, 453 P.2d 146). 
Whether the Shondel doctrine applies to reduce charges is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Hernandez, 2003 UT App 276, f^ 6, 76 P.3d 198. 
In this case, defendant was charged with fraudulent handling of recordable 
writings, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503 (1999) (R. 1-3). 
Defendant claims that this charge should have been reduced under Shondel to either 
making a written false statement, a class B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
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504(1) (1999), or falsification of a government record, a class B misdemeanor under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-511 (1999). Aplt. Br. at 19-21.5 
A person commits fraudulent handling of recordable writings under section 76-6-
503 (the "fraudulent handling statute") if, "with intent to deceive or injury anyone [he] 
falsifies . . . any . . . deed . . . or other writing for which the law provides public 
recording." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503(1) (emphasis added). 
A person is guilty of a written false statement under subsection (1) of section 76-8-
504 if "[h]e makes a written false statement which he does not believe to be true on or 
pursuant to a form bearing a notification authorized by law to the effect that false 
statements made therein are punishable." Id. §76-8-504(1). 
Finally, a person is guilty of falsification of government records under subsections 
(1) or (2) of section 76-8-511 if he either 
(1) knowingly makes a false entry in or false alteration of 
anything belonging to, received, or kept by the government 
for information or record, or required by law to be kept for 
information of the government; [or] 
(2) presents or uses anything knowing it to be false and with a 
purpose that it be taken as a genuine part of information or 
records referred to in subsection (1). 
Id. §76-8-511. 
5Although defendant suggests "that the elements of § 76-6-504, 'tampering with 
records,' . . . could also be applicable under the fact scenario of the present case," Aplt. 
Br. at 20 n.3, section 76-6-504 expressly excludes "the writings enumerated in Section 
76-6-503," Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-504(1) (1999). Thus, the State does not address 
defendant's footnote further. 
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A simple comparison of the statutes makes clear that fraudulent handling statute 
contains two elements not required under the other two. First, unlike for the other two 
crimes, the State must prove that the defendant acted "with intent to deceive or injure" 
someone. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503. Second, unlike for the other two crimes, the State 
must prove that the document at issue is one "for which the law provides public 
recording." Id. 
Thus, the fraudulent handling statute does not contain exactly the same elements as 
the two other statutes. Moreover, because it only covers writings "for which the law 
provides public recording," see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503, the fraudulent handling 
statute clearly criminalizes more specific conduct than that covered by the other two 
statutes. For both these reasons, defendant's Shondel claim fails. See Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 
U 33; Hernandez, 2003 UT App 276, % 8; Hill, 688 P.2d at 451. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED U>_ March 2004. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KARENA.KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
24 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on/£_ March 2004,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to William B. Parson, III, 
440 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, Attorney for Appellant. 
£wu^ Q. PluC2i^(r 
25 
Addendum A 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
76-6-503. Fraudulent handling of recordable writings. 
(1) Any person who with intent to deceive or injure anyone falsifies, 
destroys, removes, or conceals any will, deed, mortgage, security instrument, 
or other writing for which the law provides public recording is guilty of 
fraudulent handling of recordable writings. 
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings is a felony of the third 
degree. 
76-8-504. Written false statement. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(1) He makes a written false statement which he does not believe to be 
true on or pursuant to a form bearing a notification authorized by law to 
the effect that false statements made therein are punishable; or 
(2) With intent to deceive a public servant in the performance of his 
official function, he: 
(a) Makes any written false statement which he does not believe to 
be true; or 
(b) Knowingly creates a false impression in a written application 
for any pecuniary or other benefit by omitting information necessary 
to prevent statements therein from being misleading; or 
(c) Submits or invites reliance on any writing which he knows to be 
lacking in authenticity; or 
(d) Submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, map, 
boundary mark, or other object which he knows to be false. 
(3) No person shall be guilty under this section if he retracts the 
falsification before it becomes manifest that the falsification was or would 
be exposed. 
76-8-511. Falsification or alteration of government 
record. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
(1) Knowingly makes a false entry in or false alteration of anything 
belonging to, received, or kept by the government for information or 
record, or required by law to be kept for information of the government; or 
(2) Presents or uses anything knowing it to be false and with a purpose 
that it be taken as a genuine part of information or records referred to in 
(1); or 
(3) Intentionally and unlawfully destroys, conceals, or otherwise im-
pairs the verity or availability of any such thing. 
Addendum B 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS LEASE AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of the 2nd day of July, 
2001, between BACA ENTERPRISES, INC. a Utah corporation ("Lessor"), and PACIFIC 
NAKON INTERNATIONA!., INC., a Nevada corporation ("Lessee"). 
A. Lessor is the owner of 62.4 ac? 
notices) of undeveloped land or 
campground), as described in E: 
County property tax notices) of 
appurtenances thereunto pertain 
attached hereto and made a part 
water and water rights, as more 
made apart heieof by leference. 
R E C I T A L S : 
s (61.4 acres is stated on the Kane County property lax 
partially developed land (area South of highway, including 
\hibit "B"; and 6.6 acres (6.65 acres is stated on the Kane 
leveloped land on North s: le of highway, with any and all 
ng, as described in Exhibit "A"; and which Exhibits are 
hereof by reference. Also included are 24.9338 acre feel of 
particularly described in Exhibit "C", attached hereto and 
These tluce Exhibits comprkc, collectively, the "Property". 
B. Lessor desires to lease to Lessee and Lessee desires to lease 
terms and conditions in this Lease. 
iom Lessor the Property on the 
C. Lessor desires to assign to Les.sce, and Lessee desiies to use, all real property, water rights, 
buildings, business activities, vendor agreements, campgiound, curio store inventoiy, 
business goodwill, and all othci personal and intellectual property relating to the Property, 
including, without limitation, the right to develop such Property, on the terms and conditions 
in this Lease. 
A G R E E M E N T 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, mutual covenants and 
agreements herein contained, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is 
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1. Lease. Lessor leases to Lessee and Lessee leases " om Lessor the Property for the 
term, at the rental, and upon all other terms, covenants, and com' lions in this Lease. Lcssoi f' >cs 
hereby grant, demise and let, and Lessee dues hereby agree to I Le the properly and water ii[, its 
described in Exhibits "A", "B", and "C", with any and all appur! :iumces thereunto appertainiiv-.. 
2. Initial Term. The initial term of this Lease shall be for 50 years ("Initial Tcrnf) 
commencing on July 1, 2001 ("Commenci incnt Date"), and < nding on June 30, 2051, unless 
sooner terminated pursuant to the terms of this Lease ("Termina'ion Date"). 
Wlr-IM 








SI ATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY O f -KME ) 3 S 
Copy Of Tnc Original Instrument Filed For Record The -S;.fe 
Day Of _ _ ^ u l i 4 _
 1 A D w T o o T ~ 
In Boo*' ._2£ftSL , — P a ^ - ^ Z T r - w t ' " " 
KAr:E COUNTY RECORDS. ^ ^ - ^ W K S Q T " ' 
Witness h/\y Hand And Soal _ 
3. Option to Extend, Lessee shall have the option to extend the term of this Lease for 
50 years following the expiration of the Initial Term on all the terms and conditions in this Lease. 
To exercise this option, Lessee must give Lessor written notice of exercise of the option ("Option 
Notice") no earlier than 24 months and no later than 6 months prior to the expiiation of the Initial 
Term. 
4. Base Rent. The base rent shall be $250,000 per year payable in equal monthly 
installments of $20,833.34, with the first month's rent being due upon the execution of this 
LEASE AGREEMENT, and continuing Ihcrealler \m the first day of each month until the end of 
the term of this Lease. In addition to said base rent, Lessee shall pay Lessor an additional 
payment of $250,000 on or before August 1, 2001, which payment shall be deemed the rent for 
the last year of this initial term (or rent for the period July 1, 2050 to June 30, 2051). The base 
rent shall be adjusted upward every 5 years to keep pace with inflation in the national economy, 
with the first such adjustment to be made on July 1, 2006 in this manner: With the United States 
Consumer Price Index (USCPI) at July 1, 2001, or the nearest date thereto, as the denominator 
and the USCPI as of July 1, 2006 as the nominator, the quotient (to four decimal places) of that 
division shall be multiplied by $20,833.34 (the monthly base lent for the previous five years), 
and the product shall be the new monthly base rent for the next five years. A similar adjustment 
shall be made in the same manner every five years thereafter for as long as this Lease is in force, 
with the denominator on each such adjustment being the USCPI at the start of the prior five years 
and with the numerator being the current USCPI, or the end of the five year period just 
concluded. In the event the denominator is larger than the numerator, no adjustment shall be 
made, and the base rent for the prior five years shall continue as the base rent for an additional 
five years. In other words, no such adjustment shall ever result in a decrease in the base rent. 
5. Percentage Rent. In addition to the base rent agreed to be paid by Lessee pursuant 
to Section 4 above, Lessee shall pay to Lessor an additional rental in an amount equal to two 
(2%) percent of Lessee's gross levenucs, and all Sub-Lessee's gross rcyenues, generated from 
the Property, or any part thereof, whether said gross revenues come from the operation of the 
business and/or businesses now existing or the business and/or businesses yet to be started and 
carried out on the property in the future. This two percent shall apply to all kinds of gross 
revenue, including the sale of timeshares or the like in the hotel that is planned for the Property. 
This percentage rent shall be deferred until January 1, 2004, and shall not be payable or 
commence accruing until January 1, 2004. This deferral has been agreed to in order to allow 
Lessee two and one-half years to become fully operational before the percentage rent begins. In 
this regard, Lessee represents that they shall piocced with due diligence with their plans, and 
represent that, unless there arc intervening causes and unavoidable delays, that the existing 
properties will be remodeled by the end of 2002 and that by the end of 2003, the campground 
will be improved and fully operational and that the planned motel, with approximately 100 
rooms, will be in full operation. 
In the event water from the assigned water rights and wells (which could exceed 
500 gallons per minute) are diverted and used by Lessee in other areas of Lessee's anticipated 
future developments not leased from Lessor, then Lessee shall pay a similar percentage of the 
2 nZP^-Hvs 
gross revenues of Lessee (or Sub-Lessees from Lessee) from these other operations where su< 
water is used. 
6. Assignment of Other Property. For the purpose of allowing Lessee to continue and 
carry on the existing businesses and to enable Lessee to maximize their gross revenues from the 
Property under this lease, Lessor hereby assigns to Lessee all of Lessor's interest in real 
property, water rights, buildings, business activities, vendor agreements, campground, curio store 
inventory, business goodwill, and all other personal and intellectual property relating or 
appertaining to the Property, including, without limitation, the right to develop such Property in 
any manner acceptable to Lessee, so long as there is no uncured default under the terms of this 
Lease. 
7. Books and Records. Lessee shall keep and maintain on the Property, or at 
Lessee's headquarters elsewhere in the State of Utah, full, complete, and appropriate books and 
records of sales and revenues from the Property and other developments of Lessee i elating to 
Section 5, above, in accordance with standard accounting practice. These books and records 
shall at all reasonable times and upon reasonable notice be open for inspection and copying by 
Lessor, Lessor's auditors, or any other authorized representatives of Lessor. 
8. Use. Lessee, and any subsidiaries, affiliated entities, or concessionaires as 
Lessee may desire, will occupy and use the Property for any business purpose and all operations 
incident to the conduct of such business, with all such operations subject to the percentage rent 
stated in paragraph 5. Lessee may erect and maintain on the Property and the buildings and 
improvements any signs advertising Lessee's business as Lessee may desire. Lessee shall not 
commit any waste or any public or private nuisance upon the Property, and Lessee shall comply 
with all laws, rules, and orders of all federal, state, and municipal governments or age ncies that 
may be applicable to use of the Properly. Lessee may only develop the Property in wa>s that are 
commensurate and compatible with the scenic nature of the Property. 
9. Utilities. Beginning on the Commencement Date and throughout the term of this 
Lease, Lessee shall pay, before delinquency, all charges or assessments for telephone, water, 
sewer, gas, heat, electricity, garbage disposal, trash disposal, and all other utilities and services of 
any kind that may be used on the Property. 
10. Taxes. Lessee shall pay to the public authorities charged with the collection on or 
before the last day on which payment may be made without penalty or interest, as additional rent, 
all property taxes, other taxes, permits, fees, inspection costs, and license fees, and other public 
charges of whatever nature that are assessed against the Property or arise because of the 
occupancy, use, or possession of the Property (including, but not limited to, taxes on, or which 
shall be measured by, any sales of goods, or rents or rental income, and taxes on personal 
property, and water rights, whether of Lessor or Lessee), subsequent to the Commencement 
Date, and all installments of assessments that are due during the term of this Lease. Lessor shall 
give appropriate written instructions to public authorities for taxes, assessments, and public 
charges payable by Lessee to ensure that statements and billings will be mailed directly by public 
authorities to Lessee at an address designated by Lessee. 
11. Repairs and Maintenance. Lessee shall, at Lessee's own expense, keep the Property 
(including, without limitation, water lines, water pumps, and all water works) in good condition 
and repair, reasonable wear and tear and use and loss by fire or other casually or by earthquake 
or other act of God excepted. In the event of any loss covered by the insurance required by 
paragraph 13, Lessee shall use all such insurance proceeds that may be payable to Lessee to 
restore or rebuilt the damage generating the insurance proceeds, unless the Lessors agree in 
writing to some other disposition of the insurance proceeds. 
12. Alterations. Lessee shall have the right to make alterations to any buildings and 
improvements on the Property. All improvements, additions, alterations, and major repairs shall 
be in accordance with applicable laws and at the Lessee's own expense. Lessee shall indemnify 
and defend Lessor for all liens, claims, or damages caused by remodeling, improvements, 
additions, alterations, and major repairs. Lessor shall, when requested by lessee, execute and 
deliver any applications, consents, or other instruments required to permit Lessee to develop the 
Property, perform such work, or to obtain permits for such work. Lessee will not at any time 
permit any mechanics', laborers', or materialmens' liens to stand against the Property for any 
labor or material furnished to Lessee or claimed to have been furnished to Lessee or Lessee's 
agents, contractors, or subtenants and sub-lessees, in connection with work of any character 
performed or claimed to have been performed on the Property by or at the direction or sufferance 
of Lessee; provided, however, that Lessee shall have the right to contest the validity or amount of 
any lien or claimed lien, upon giving Lessor a letter executed by Lessee assuring that the lien or 
claimed lien will be paid, when and to the extent that the lien is finally determined to be valid 
and owing. Lessee's right, however, to contest these liens shall not extend beyond the point 
where Lessor's title to the Pioperly could be lost. On final determination of the lien or claim of 
lien, Lessee shall immediately pay any final judgment rendered against Lessee, with all proper 
costs and charges, and shall have the lien released or judgment satisfied, nt. Lessee's own 
expense. 
All such new construction, improvements, additions, alleiations, and repairs, or 
improvements of any kind, shall be deemed part of the real property, and at the termination of 
this lease, or in the event of any default on this Lease, all such items shall remain and stay on the 
properly. In addition, all furniture, fixtures, equipment, and other personal property used to carry 
on the businesses on the Property, shall, at the termination of this lease or upon default, remain 
with the property and inure to the benefit of Lessors in the event they must terminate the Lease, 
take possession of the Property, and resume business in their own right. 
13. Insurance. Lessee shall, at all times during the term of this Lease, and during any 
extension, maintain in force, at Lessee's sole cost and expense, insuiance on the buildings and 
improvements now existing or that may be built or placed on the Properly, against the hazard of 
fire, with standard extended coverage, including vandalism and malicious mischief, in an amount 
equal to their full insurable value, with a replacement cost endorsement, excluding the cost of 
excavation and of foundation below the level of the lowest basement floor, or if there is no 
basement, below the level of the ground. Lessee shall also procure and maintain public liability 
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insurance, including products and completed operations insurance, from a responsible insurance 
company authorized to do business in the State of Utah, with a combined single limit of not less 
than $1,000,000 for injury or death to any person or damage to property and $5,000,000 excess 
umbrella coverage for injury or death or property damage, for any claims, demands, or causes of 
action of any person arising out of accidents occurring on the Property during the term of the 
Lease or arising out of Lessee's use of the Property. 
14. Default Remedies. In the event Lessee materially defaults under this Lease, 
Lessor's sole and exclusive remedy is to terminate this Lease and all rights of Lessee under this 
Lease by giving Lessee written notice that this Lease is terminated, in which case Lessor may 
recover from Lessee the full value of a $5,000,000.00 bond Lessee owns on certain oil wells and 
natural gas deposits and which matures May 5, 2003. The bond will be held by John L. Miles, 
Lessor's attorney. Said bond is more fully identified in paragraph 16 of this Lease. Lessee shall, 
upon any uncurcd default and upon Lessor's request, endorse and otherwise cooperate with 
Lessor in selling or cashing said bond. In the event Lessor finds that the bond cannot be sold or 
liquidated for cash (for example, the terms stated on said bond say that the bond may be honored 
with oil and gas reserves), or if Lessor for any other reason finds recourse against the bond 
unavailable or unsatisfactory, then Lessee agrees that Lessor may pursue the Lessee (Pacific 
Nakon) directly for any and all of their damages caused by any default under this Lease, subject 
however, to a cap or a limit of five million dollars. The figure for this limitation comes from the 
fact that Lessee, in prior negotiations, once offered as much as five million for the outright 
purchase of Lessor's property included in this Lease. The parties recognize the possibility that if 
Lessee defaults at a time when the SB A loan is still unpaid and at a lime when the subordination 
(under paragraph 16) may be in effect up to $500,000.00, that the property could be lost through 
foreclosure because the Lessor lacks the financial resources to assume or discharge loans of that 
size, and Lessoi could thereby suffer damages equal to the total value of the property. In this 
icgard, for as long as any subordination referred to in paragraph 16 is in effect, LaMar Jensen, 
the principal stockholder of Lessee, agrees to be personally liable under this Lease for any and 
all damages Lessor may sustain, likewise capped or limited, however, to said five million dollars. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, in the event Lessee breaches any term or 
condition of this Lease, Lessee shall have 15 days to cure, and Lessor shall be entitled to a 
default payment equal to ten (10%) percent of any amount outstanding and unpaid, together with 
their attorney's fees and costs to the time of cure. 
15. Employment of Children and Transitional Period. Lessee shall employ the children 
and spouses of Ted and Cecelia Baca (namely, Frank Baca, Ernie Baca, and Josie Tait) to 
perform work for the Lessee on the Property, either full time or part time, as said persons may 
desire, and at a salary or hourly wage in management positions suitable for their experience and 
abilities, with compensation equal to or greater than similar employees of Lessee. Such work 
shall commence as soon as operations make it possible. During the transitional period, Ted Baca 
and Cecelia Baca agree to assist Lessee with their expertise, knowledge, and experience to help 
Lessee make a smooth transition and to maximize revenues during such period. In return, Lessee 
ngrees that Ted Baca and Cecelia Baca may continue to reside on the property until such time 
that they find suitable housing elsewhcie. It is anticipated that this transitional period will be 
about three months, but could extend for as many as six months. 
&f* 
16. Subordination. Upon request by Lessee, Lessor shall subordinate its interest in and 
to the Property to such construction and development loans, mortgages, promissory notes, and 
deeds of trust arising from, or related to, Lessee's development of the Property, and shall execute 
all documents required by such lenders or financial institutions, subject, however, to a maximum 
combined limit of no more than $500,000.00 and to a limitation of no more than 12 months from 
the date hereof (or until July 1, 2002) that Lessor's position will be so suboidinated. Thus, there 
may be more than one loan, but the combined total of all loans shall never exceed $500,000.00. 
All such subordinated interests will be paid in full and released of record no later than July 1, 
2002. A violation of this paragraph shall result in an immediate termination of this Lease, and 
entitle Lessor to cash and retain the full value of the $5,000,000.00 bond held by John L. Miles, 
identified as 1SIN: US747958AA48, CUSIP NUMBER: 747958 AA4. The proceeds from all 
such loans shall be used to improve the Property and increase Lessee's equity interest in the 
Property. Lessee shall submit to Lessor documentation showing the use of all such loans and 
proving that said loan proceeds were used to increase the value of the Property. 
If any mortgage or deed of trust to which this Lease is subordinate is foreclosed or a deed in lieu 
of foreclosure is given to the mortgagee or beneficiary, Lessee shall attorn to the purchaser at the 
foreclosure sale or to the grantee under the deed in lieu ol foreclosure. If any mortgage or deed 
of trust to which this Lease is subordinate is foreclosed or a deed in lieu of foreclosure is given to 
the mortgagee or beneficiary, this Lease shall not be barred, terminated, cut off, or foreclosed. 
Neither shall the rights and possession of Lessee under this Lease be disturbed, if Lessee is not 
then in default in the payment of rental and other sums due under this Lease or otherwise in 
default under the terms of this Lease. 
17. Mediation and Arbitration (Dispute Resolution). 
17.1. Any claim, dispute, or controversy arising out of or in connection with or relating 
to the validity, interpretation, performance, or termination of this Lease or the breach or alleged 
breach thereof (collectively, "Claims") that the parties cannot icsolve amicably withm a 
reasonable tune, shall be submitted by either party to mediation in the City of Saint George, State 
of Utah, according to the Mediation and Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association ("Rules"), and if the parties cannot resolve such Claims'through good faith 
mediation, then any unresolved Claims shall be submitted by the pailies to binding arbitration in 
Saint George, Utah, according to the Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in 
effect on the date of this Lease. In the event of any conflict betweci the Rules and this Section 
17, the provisions of this Section 17 shall govern. 
17.2. Mediation, and, if such mediation is unsuccessful in the resolution of any Claims, 
then arbitration hereunder, shall be the parties' exclusive remedy and no party to any arbitration 
shall be required to exhaust any local, administrative, or judicial remedy. 
17.3. If mediation fails to resolve any such Claims, then either party may request 
arbitration within a reasonable time thereafter, and shall give written notice of such to the other 
party and a brief description of the dispute or disputes which such party desires to be arbitrated. 
Within six (6) weeks after notification to do so by the AAA, each party shall appoint one 
arbitrator, who shall be a person with substantial experience and competence with respect to the 
subject matter of the dispute, and have no relationship with the parties or any of their affiliated 
companies. The two (2) arbitrators appointed by the parties shall, within 30 days after their 
appointment, appoint a third, presiding arbitrator. If either party fails to nominate an aibitrator, 
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or the two arbitrators appointed by the parlies are unable to appoint a presiding arbitrator within 
the stated periods, such arbitrator(s), meeting the aforementioned qualifications, shall be 
appointed by the AAA according to the Rules and the arbitration shall proceed in Saint George, 
Utah. 
17.4. The arbitrators shall, by majority vote, render a v>;illen decision stating reasons 
therefor within six (6) months after the completion of the arbitration hearing. Any award granted 
shall be rendered in such form that judgment may be entered thereon in any court having 
jui isdiction thereof. 
17.5. The parties hereto further agree that both mediatku and arbitration proceedings 
shall be instituted within one year after the asserted Claims occuncd, and that failure to institute 
mediation and arbitration proceedings within such period shall constitute an absolute bar to the 
institution of any proceeding and a waiver of such condition. 
17.6. This Section 17 shall survive any termination of this Lease. 
18.0. Miscellaneous. 
18.1. This Lease supersedes all prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreements, 
representations, warranties and understandings and contains the entire agreement between the 
parties hereto. No amendment, modification, termination, or waiver of any provision of this 
Lease or consent to any departure therefrom, shall in any event be effective unless the same shall 
be in writing and signed by duly authorized representatives of each party hereto and then such 
waiver or consent shall be effective only in the specific instance and for the specific purpose for 
which given. No notice to, or demand on, either party in any case shall entitle it to any other or 
further notice or demand in similar or other circumstances. No failure or delay on the part of 
either party in exercising any right, power or remedy hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof, 
nor shall any single or partial exercise of any such light, power or remedy preclude any other or 
further exercise thereof or the exeicise of any other right, power or remedy hereunder. 
18.2. This Lease shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto 
and their respective successors and assigns, except that Lessee shall have no right to assign or 
otherwise transfer all or a major portion of its rights hereunder or major interest in this Lease 
without the prior written consent of Lessor, which consent Lessor will not unreasonably withhold 
if the assignee is as equally sound financially and has the ability and business experience to carry 
out this lease without default. Any assignment in violation of this paragraph 18.2 shall be void. 
18.3. All notices, requests, demands, directions and other communications provided for 
hereunder shall be in writing and shall be served either personally or delivered by first class or 
express U.S. mail with postage prepaid, return receipt requested pursuant to registered or 
cei titled mail, or by a nationally recognized overnight commercial courier service with charges 
prepaid, to the applicable party at the addicss of such party as shall be designated by such party 
in a written notice to the other party complying as to delivery with the terms of this paragraph 
18.3. Notices may also effectively be given by transmittal over electronic transmitting devices if 
the party to whom the notice is being sent has a receiving device in its office, and provided a 
complete copy of the notice shall also be served cither personally or in the same manner as 
required for a mailed notice. Notices shall be deemed received at the earlier of actual receipt or 
five days following deposit in the U.S. mail with postage prepaid or two days following deposit 
with a nationally recognized overnight commercial courier service with charges prepaid. 
18.4. No parly hereto shall be deemed the drafter of this Lease and in the event this Lease 
is ever construed by a court of law, such court shall not construe this Lease or any provision of 
this Lease against any party as the drafter of this Lease. 
18.5. Headings in this Lease are included herein for convenience of reference only and 
shall not constitute a part of this Lease for any other purpose. 
18.6. Whenever the context of this Lease requires, words used in the singular shall be 
construed to include the plural and vice versa; and pronouns of whatsoever gender shall be 
deemed to include and designate the masculine, feminine or neutcj gender. 
18.7. Should any party to this Lease reasonably retain legal counsel for the purpose of 
instituting any action or proceeding before the AAA, to enforce or to prevent the breach of any 
provision of this Lease, for damages by reason of any alleged breach, for a declaration of such 
party's rights or obligations under this Lease, for injunctive relief, or for any other arbitrated 
remedy, then the prevailing parly shall be entitled to be reimbursed by the non-prevailing party 
for all costs and expenses incurred in connection therewith, including, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorneys' fees for the services rendered to the prevailing party. 
18.8. Lessor shall indemnify and hold Lessee harmless from and against any and all 
claims, damages and liabilities whatsoever, asserted by any pcison or entity, resulting directly or 
indirectly from, related to, or accruing under, any breach of this Lease or violation of a»iy 
environmental and/or hazardous waste rules, regulations, or laws, by Lessor or any of Its 
employees and/or agents; and Lessee shall indemnify and hold Lessor harmless from and against 
any and all claims, damages and liabilities whatsoever, asserted by any person or entity, resulting 
directly or indirectly from, related to, or accruing under, any breach of this Lease or violation of 
any environmental and/or hazardous waste rules, regulations, or laws, by Lessee or any of its 
employees and/or agents. Such indemnification shall include the payment of all reasonable 
attorneys' fees and other costs incurred by the other party in defending any such claims. 
18.9. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, excluding its conflict of laws rules. Any provision of this Lease that is 
prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the 
extent of such prohibition or unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provisions 
hereof or affecting the validity or enforceability of such provision in any other jurisdiction, and 
the remainder of this Lease shall be valid and binding as though such unenforceable or 
prohibited provisions were not included herein; provided, however, that the parties shall 
negotiate in good faith with respect to an equitable modification of the provisions held to be 
invalid, if any, so as to replace such provisions as nearly as may be possible with v.iid 
provisions having the same commercial or practical effect. This Lease may be executed in any 
number of counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be deemed to be an 
original and all of which taken together shall constitute but one and the same instrument binding 
on all the parties hereto, notwithstanding that all the parties are not signatory to the original or 
the same counterpart. 
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18.10. Lessee has been made aware that Frank Baca is the owner of certain items OQ/ 
Property, including 3 cabins, a hogan, and a teepee for which he desires sepai'ate payment of 
$6,000.00 and also certain vending equipment for which he desires separate payment of 
$2,000.00, and Lessee will deal with Frank on such items. In addition, Lessor has prepaid 
certain business obligations which may possibly add up to a total of $17,000.00. To avoid the 
inconvenience of settling these items separately, the parties agree that Lessee will pay an 
additional $25,000.00 on August 1, 2001 as full payment for Frank Baca's personal property and 
all of the prepaid items, and regardless of whether these items are greater or lesser than this 
estimate, the $17,000.00 is a set figure which need not be adjusted. 
18.11. Lessee shall have the right lo assume the existing SB A loan against the property. 
Lessors existing debts that affect the property are approximately $213,000.00 owed to the SBA; 
two loans owed to State Bank of Southern Utah, one with a balance due of approximately 
$98,000.00 and one with a balance of approximately $35,000.00; and $21,000.00 owed to Rex 
Jackson on water rights. When Lessee makes the $250,000.00 payment due August 1, 2001, 
Lessor agree to use that payment to pay HI full three of these obligations: (1) the $98,000.00 loan 
owed to State Bank of Southern Utah; (2) the $35,000.00 loan owed to State Bank of Southern 
Utah; and (3) the $21,000.00 loan owed lo Rex Jackson. Lessee has made arrangements to 
assume the $213,000.00 loan owed to the SBA, which assumption will release Lessor and the 
Bacas completely from all legal obligations related to the SBA loan. Lessor agrees to reimburse 
Lessee for monthly payments made on this SBA loan. Lessee intends to pay this SBA loan in 
full, perhaps within 12 months, and in that event, Lessee agrees to allow Lessor lo continue witli 
payments at the same SBA interest rale and Lessor agrees lo fully reimburse Lessee, with said 
interest, when they receive a balloon payment on another contract which is scheduled to be paid 
on August 4, 2006. 
IN WITNESS WHERUOF, the authorized representatives of the parties hereto 
have duly executed this Agreement as of" the day and year hereinabove first written. 
LESSOR: 
Baca Enterprises, Inc. 
T i t l e : ( ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
LESSEE: 
Pacific Nakpa International, Inc. 
U>k-~m 
Exhibit "A" 
The following described tract of land in Kane County, State of Utah: 
BEGINNING at the North 1/4 comer of Section 21, Township 41 South Range 9 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence West along the Section line 551.24 feet; 
thence South 348.07 feet to the North boundary of State Highway 9; thence North 77037'48" 
East 1,377.62 feet along said North boundary to a point of tangency with a 6089.74 foot 
ladius curve to the right; thence Noitheasterly 289 63 feet along the arc of said curve to its 
intersection with the section line; thence West 1,067.96 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 6.65 acres, moie or less 
Exhibit "B" 
The following desciibed real property situated in Kane County, State of Utah: 
BEGINNING at a point ftom which the Northwest Corner of Section 21, Township 41 Soutli, 
Range 9 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian bears North 0°03' West 937.5 feet, said point of 
beginning being on the Southerly right of way boundary of State Highway U-15, running thence 
along said right of way North 77°22,30" East 3545.7 feet, thence South 1163.5 feet, thence 
North 89°54' West 3469.6 feet; and thence North 0°03' West 382.5 feet to beginning. 
Together with any and all appurtenances thereunto appertaining. 
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Exhibit X " 
Water Right 81-394 
Flow: 1.5-acrefeet 
Souice: Unnamed Spring 
Common Description: East of East Zion Entrance 
Point of Diversion: Surface 
Owner: Theodore and Cecilia Baca 
Pi iority: 07/06/1959 
Time of use: Year round 
Purpose: Stockwatering: 3 cattle 
Domestic: 1 Family 
Other: 3 Double Cabins, cafe, and 1 service station 
Water Right 81-3811 
Flow: 10-acre feet 
Source: Big Geek (Kolob Creek) 
Common Description: 
Point of Diversion: Surface changed to underground watei and application is valid 
until 11/30/2002 for two wells. As of 2/16/2001 one well had been drilled. 
Owner: Theodore and Cecilia Baca 
Priority: 10/26/1926 
Time of use: Year round 
Purpose: Iirigation: 3.33 acres 
Domestic Use: one well for 60-room motel and 125-seat restaurant 
Water Right 81-101 
Flow: 1138-acie feet 
Source: Clear Creek 
Common Description: East of East Zion National Park 
Point of Diversion: Surface 
Owner: Theodore and Cecilia Baca 
Priority: 03/05/1924 
Time of use: Year lound 
Purpose: Irrigation 
Exhibit "C" Page 1 
Water Right 81-1601 
Flow: 1.32-acrefeet 
Source: Underground water well 
Common Description: 
Point of Diversion: Underground 
Owner: Theodore and Cecilia Baca 
Priority: 08/23/1961 
Time of use: Year round 
Purpose: Other: water used in operation of cafe and service station. 
Water Right 81-3960 
Flow: 2-acre feet 
Source: Underground Water Well 
Common Description: 
Point of Diversion: Underground 
Owner: Theodore and Cecilia Baca 
Priority: 08/23/1961 
Time of use: Year round 
Purpose: Stockwalering: 71 cattle 
Water Right 81-3868 
Flow: 10-acre feet 
Source: Big Creek (Kolob Creek) 
Common Description: 
Point of Diversion: Surface the water has an application for change from surface 
water to underground due date 11/30/2002 and further change has been applied 
for domestic use. 
Owner: Theodore and Cecilia Baca 
Priority: 10/26/1926 
Time of use: Year round 
Purpose: Irrigation 3.3 acres 
Summary 
Water Right # Acre Feet Point of Diversion 
81-394 1.5 Surface 
81-101 0.1138 Surface 
81-3811 10,0 Underground 
81-1601 1.32 Underground 
81-3960 2.00 Underground 
81-3868 10.00 Underground 
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STAliOFUTAH ) 
CQUi r^OF€A)b1HbAKE ) 
Oa the c L l i L d a y of Jta%2001, personally appcwed before me, i -4 Mdr ^nSC V\ 
•*w— . \At> feeing fey WA duly jmrarn <-Kr3 ^ y ft»f k» 1^  fa- pce£i<iev\*t~ "^ 
Qff^ JaKakoa fttttna&onftl Inc.. &Novafoe«ponition imd that the withklftni ti* forgoing fostrumcut 
ww 0f 3*d ofcbafealf of i»d corporation by lia authority of a resolution of iti bowd of director and wid 
— f c A / f l g r r T e n ^ ^ l duly acknowledged to mo tbat uid cacporattoa executed thl 
Notary Public 
JOHN 0 REESE 
55 East Main Street 
Orderville UT 84758 
My Commission Expires 
August 14 2002 
State ol Utah 
Notary Public / .* / 
STATS Of UTAH ) 
Otith*X rh day ofJwa^OOl* personally qppoirnl bifbrt me •/•••^jgrft- ffi-fc 
who being by m« duly sworn did iay fhaths is fta frPiT'^/mW' ,of 
Baca Erjtttpriici, Inc., a Utsh corporatfon and that flu wjtftfc rod the forgoing inrtrumtat was alg^d on 
Wudf of said cc«poration by its authority of a resolution of its botrd of director! end aaid 
TfeadVre. %. J2t?L<!\ dttly icknowltdgad to m*thftt said oorporatioa wscmtidHx* some, 
No'ary Public 
JOHN D RFfcSE 
55 Tast Mam Street 
Orderville UT 847b8 
My Commission Opiros 
August 14 ?002 
State of Utah 
c
r?ir, C&r*r*y U&^ sldLajj a& 
My Comrm t^on Expfrw WvMP. «^ > 
A;Np«ifi6td.wpd 
b0&-l3k O A P V W 
Addendum C 
R. Kip Paul and Tistn J. Paul. IM, 
175 E«t<WQ S<nnh, Sic. 700 
S*UUk*Ci|y,UlahB>ni 
2&«<* iknxjLr XfcOT*erV *•# 
TRUST DEED 
Wih Assignment qfRenls 
TTirS TRUST DEED \s made effective lhi$ 25 day of June, 2001, between as Pacific Nflkoa 
IntcnrafJxmat Inc^ ^%«odhBreJW^*t»F€«a^^ Baca Eiiierpr&es, Ine^ C/O 14019 117* 
PlacaN;E>,KjrkIand,WA9^^ 
whose address is 525 East 100 South, Fifih Floor; Salt LsJce City, Utah 34102 as TRUSTEE, and R. Kty 
PaulandTerriJ.PauI,Ltii,]75East4O0SoulJi,Stc.700,SftIiLalcitClty, UT 84 HI, as BENEFICIARY. 
WITNESSETH: TIuttTnwtorCttNVEYSA^ 
POWER OF SALE, the following described Water Rights shuated m Koioe Courdy, Stale of Utah; 
Water Ri«bi# 81-394 
Water RH'M#8M0i 
Water Right #8KJ8H 
Water Right #814601 
Water Right #81-3960 
Water Right #81-3861 
1.5 acre fort 
J 138 ftnre feet 
10.0 acre feet 
1,32 acre feet 
2.00 acre feet 







Together with certain, real property located in Kant County, Utah described aa follows: 
Parcel I; Beginning at the North 1/4 comet of Section 21, Township 41 Sou&, Range 9 
West, SLB&M; and running thence West along tibe section line 551.24 feet, thence South 348,07 feet to 
the Noni boundary of State Hwy. 9; thence North 77 degrees 37 rninutes 48 seconds East 1377.62 feet 
along paid north boundary to a point of tangency with a 6089.74 foot radius curve to the light; thence 
Northeasterly 289.63 Feet along the arc of said curve to its Intersection-with the section, line; thence West 
1067.96 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 6.65 acres, more or leas. 
P arce( 2: Beginning at a point froiu which the Northwest Comer of Section 21, Township 
41 South. Range 9 West, SLB&M baans North 0 degrees 3 uiinutts West 937.5 feet, said point of 
beginning being on the Southerly right of vvay boundary of State Hwy. U-15. rumiing dience along said 
right of way North 77 degrees 22 minutea 30 seconds East 3545.7 feet, thance Soutk 1163.5 fest, thence 
North 89 degrees 54 minuics We$t 3469.6 feet; aud thence North 0 degrees 03 rainutes W#>t 382.5 feet 
to Uie beginning. 
Together with any and all sppurtenanceej there unto pertaining, 
N07 at TfUUtK, mwt be t member of iho Limb 3l»jc 3arf •. bank buUdlnz nod Jopn issocfation or saving and loan tsmduion aulkojtoJ 
la do roah bttjilr>c« In Utah; x carpanrtlo*; aythoriacd to do -ft Irust business MI Utah; 6r a lidc Insurance gr «tx»triuzi cxmtpaity vuthamxd u> 
do --,ich bttti/x^s ID Utth 
MHO 
RECORDER'S MEMO* 
Legibility o! wrilmg, typing or 
punting unsatisfactory in this 
Document vrhon received 
STATE OF UTAH )
 s s 
K^fcf^S02k_ 
KANE COUNTY RECORDS. 
Witney WHand And Seal G u . , , ^ , 
T h i s - 3 * ^ ^ ^ ^ 
By—- " ^ ^ K a i S CountyRecordsr 
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(This will be B second trust deed on PareeU J and X subject to a first Tn*5t Deed of not mare than 
£254.000.00 owad to the SBA, Trustor represents that the Trust Deed dated November 7, i 9£5 in fever 
of State Bank of Southern Utah, recorded afi Entry No. 55503 to bora paid and that the balance owed the 
State Bank of Southern Utah pursuant to the Trust Dead dated October 20,1993, recorded &? Entry No. 
77583 is $96,000,00, and will be paid, in foil before My 15,200L) 
Together with all of the Trustors right, title aruj interest in and to that certainlease agreement with 
Theodore S. Baca, Cecil la S, Baca, and Baca Enterprises* Inc. dated April 27,2001, as it may be fended. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and;&J] water rights, rights-of-way, 
subdivided lots, end improvements constructed therefor, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, 
tenements, hereditaments, privileges and Appurtenance* thereunto belonging* &ovv or hereafter used or 
enjoyed v rth said property, or any part tiraeof, SUBJECT HOWEVER, to the right, power and sulhority 
hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiaries to collect tmd apply such rent?, issues, snd profits. 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by prom isstny note uf 
even date herewith, in the principal sum of 5235,125.00, made by Trustors, payable to the order of the 
named Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with, interest as therein Set forth, and airy extensions 
and/or renewals or modifications thereof, (2) the performance of each a0jeetn6m of Trustor herein 
contained; (3) die payment of £uch additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or 
his successor* or -assigns, when evidenced by a promissory noLe or notes inciting that they are secured by 
this Trust Deed; and (4) tha payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant 
to the terras hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided, 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES: 
1. To keep said property in good condition And repair; not to remove or demolish any building 
thereon; to complete or restore promptly and in good and worlananlike manner any building which may 
be constructed, d&mag6dL or destroyed thereon; to comply with, all laws, covenants and restrictions 
affecting aaidproperty; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to wrcuiiit, suffer ar permit ?my set upon 
said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the chapter or usa of said property may 
be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein Dot excluding the general, ID protectee water 
tights and the lines, pumps and other equipment related thereto that arc used in connection therewith in 
good condition and repair. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth, fasts showing 
a default by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorised to accepts true and condusive all facts 
and statements therein, and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. To provide end maintain Insurance, of auch type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may 
require on the Improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Such insurance 
shall be carried in companies approved by Beneflcisry with loS9 payable clauses in favor of and in form 
acceptable to Beneficiary. IneVtttf of loss. Trustor shall giva immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may 
- 2 -
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raake proof of loss, and each insurance company wncerned is hereby ainhorized and directed to mabc 
paytnent for such loss directly to Beueficiary instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the 
insurance proceeds, or my part thereof may be applied by Beneficiary, at iia option, to reduction of the 
indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair of the j , roporty damaged-
3* To deliver to. pay for and. maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby 
i* paid ia full, such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, jWuding abstracts of titic or policies of 
title insurance and any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding j. importing to afleci ihe security hereof 
d?c title to said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary tyt Trustee; and should. Beneficiary or 
Trustee eject to also appear ia or ddfead eny Huch action, or proceeding, to pay alj costs and expenses, 
including coat of evidence of title and attorneys' feea in a. ressunable sura inourr* d by Beneficiary or 
Trustee, 
5. TopayaileastlOdayst^oadeUnq^ 
including all as&essments upon water company stock end all rents, assessments and dhsrges fbr water* to 
file unnecessary documents with the State of Utah or elsewhere, to diligently use the vatfir interests where 
quired; to pay, when due, ail encinnbrances, charges, and liens with, interest, on saJ d property or any pair 
thereof, which at any tiro* appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, fees, and expenses of this 
Truat-
6. Should Trustor fail to roalce any payment or to do any act w herein p; vvided, or as required 
by the Note which thia Trust Deed secure, (lien Beneficiary or Trustee, but without obligaiion so to do 
and withoutnotice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Taylor from ciy obligation hereof, 
may; Make or do the same it) such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the 
security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorised to outer upon said propcUy for such purposes; 
commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the 
rightsof pgwer of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest or cornpTumfaeany cneutnbi ance, charge 
or lien, which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and i a exercising any such 
powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amaunta in its absolute discretion H may deem necessary 
therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay counsel's reasonable fees. 
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by E cncficiary or 
Trustee, with interest from dale of expenditure at the note rate until paid, and the n ;>a>?nent thereof sliall 
be secured hereby* 
IT 19 MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or dtunaged by reason of any public 
imptovoai«it or condemnation proceeding, or damaged ^ earthquake, or In any othfct manner. Ben^fi-dar)^ 
shall be esitjrled to all compensation, awards and_other payments or relief therefor, and shall Se entitled af 
its option to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make 
any compromise or settlement in connection with such-taking or damage. All such compen^atior^ awards, 
Ijamages, rigbg^f action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of insurance aJtecting said 
- 3 -
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jggEgy. arc hereby fCTfwri fp frrnefelary, who may, zfter deducting ihera&wn all Its «pmse$, 
including attorney's fees, apply the same on any indebtedness 50 ured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute 
such further assignments of any compensation, award, da-uage*, snd right* of action and proceed a* 
Beneficiary or Trustee may require?. 
9- At any time and torn tima 10 to 
and presentation of this Trust Deed end the note for endorsement (m ca&e of MI rocoaveymce, for 
cancellation and retention), without aiTeating the liability of any person for the 1 ayment of the 
ind^tedness secured hereby, Truste^maiLfHl^ ofM^nffiorpto cf said property; 
(b) join in granting any easeincnt or creating any restriction thereon; (c) j o b In&xiy aubordiiiatioD orotber 
agrranent adjecting this Trust Deed or the lian or charge thereof: (d) reconv^ without warranty, all or 
any pan of said property» The grantee in any reconveyance may be described^* *ihe person or persons 
entitled thereto,n and the recitals therein of any rnaiter* or facts shaU be conclusive proaf of truthfulness 
thereof, Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees forany of the services m^on^b^tpantg&pb, 
10. A3 additional security, Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during lbs continuance of these 
trusts, all rents, issues, royalties, and profits of fovpropetfy tff&tedl y this Trust Deed and of any personal 
property related thereto, Until Trustor shall default in the payment f any IIJ debtedness securedbeieby or 
intiiepcrfbraanj^Gfiiayagrc^ e right to collect all such rents, issues,, 
royalties and profits earned prion to default as they become due ajjd payable. If Trustor shall default s&_ 
flforei^Xrustor1^ tight to collect any of such, moneys shall eggs'* and Beneficiary shall bave the right, 
witta orwlriiout talcing possession of the property affected hereby J.< collect ail rants, royalties, issues, and 
profits. Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or uom tinn to \hno to collect any sucfif 
motteys shall not in any manner affect the subsequent enforcement <>f Benefi '^ary of the ri^ht, power, and 
authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein* nor the c xerrise of the right by Beneficiary to 
collect, shall be, or be construed to be. an. affirraatjoa by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor 
an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such 
tenancy, Jcase or option. 
1J. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any tixne without notice, cither 
in person, by agent, or by a receiver lo be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the 
appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the 
indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession of saidproperly or any part thereof, in its own 
name sue for or otherwise collect said rente, iesueSp and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and 
apply the same. less costs and expenses of operation end colleen on, including reasonable attorney's fees, 
upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may detenmine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of suiiiTEniH^ issues 
and profits, at the ptowsds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking 
or damage of said property, and the Application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive say 
default or notice of dcfeidt hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
13. The feiluxe on the part of Beneficiary to ptpniptly enforce any right hereunder shall not 
operate as a waiver of such ri ght £nd tl e waiver by Beneficiary of any default shaU not constitute a waiver 
of eny other or subsequent default 
- 4* 
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14. Timeis of the esfifincc hereof, Upozid^f^Jtt^Tnistormttep^yrTTieQtof ^indebtedness 
secured hereby or in the perfbnnanee of any agreement hemiiKie^ all sums seemed hereby shall 
immediately become due and payabk at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default. 
Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of eiecdontn causa 
said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hec&ofj and Trustee shall fik such notice for record in 
each county wherein said property or some pert orparcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit 
with. Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures stewed hereby, 
15. After the lapse of such, lints as may then be required by law following the rccojdajion of 
said notice o f defeulu end notice of default mid notice of sale having been given as then required by Iaw5 
Trustee, without dsmand on Trustor; shall sell said property on the date and at the time and place 
designated- h? said notice of sale, either as a whole or m separate panels, and xn such nnier a$ it may 
determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to db'rcct the order in which such property, if 
consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the 
putrhasc price payable in lawful money oftbe United Slates at the time of sale. The person conducting 
the sale may,, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be 
completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaratianthereof by such 
person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than 
one day beyond the day designated in tivs notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given hi the same manner 
as the original Dotice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed Conveying said 
property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express, or implied, Tfos recitals in the Deed of 
any matter* or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof Any person* including 
Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of die sale of payment of (l) /he costs 
And expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of lie Trustees rod 
attorney's ffer n; (1) coutof any evidencing of title procured in connection withsuchsale end revenue stamps 
on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under the terras hereof, not then repaid, wftb accrued interest at 
the Note catr per annum ftom date of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the 
remainder, Kany, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee* in its discretion, may 
deposit the bdance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare 
ad sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose tills Trust Deed in the manner 
provided by law for the foreclosing of mortgages on real property end Benefichwy ghaJ] be entitled In 
tecover in such pioceeding all costs and expends incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee 
in such amount as shall be fixed by tire court. 
17. Beneficiary may appolai a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office 
of the County Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a 
substitution of trustee, from tivz lime the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to 
all the powers> duties, authority and title oftbe trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such 
substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, mid. notice thereof shall be erven and proof thereof made, 
in (he manner provided by law, 
18. ThisTrustDeed shaJI apply to, inureto the bei^iit of, and bind 
legatee^ devisee^ administrators, executors, successors and assigns. AH obligations ofTrustorhereunder 
5 -
KHM 
07/05/01 09:33 FAX 4254021831 NW Lifestyle Pig 
07/03/01 TUE 16;56 FAX 601 355 X»« 
002 
@007 
are joint and several. The tcna "Beneficiary11 shall mean Hie owner and holder, including any pledgee, of 
thenotesficuredh&reby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes 
the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19- Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is mode 
a public record ag provided by law. Trustee k not obligated to notifr any party hereto of pending sale 
under any other Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall 
be a party, unleas brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be consumed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of 
sale hereunder be mailed to them at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
22. The above named Beneficiary request* that notice of any default, in connection with any or 
ail of the above described parcels be Bent to then* at the address set forth above. 
23. It is expressly agreed that any default on any senior or junior encumbrance secured on any 
ox all of the property described hereinis an evetit of default under this Trust Deed and the Trust Deed Note 
which it secures. The repayment of the Trust Deed Note for which this Trust Deed is given as security is 
subject to a minimum interest payment &s *&t forth in the Trust Deed Note. This Trust Deed and the Note 
which it secures are due on the sale of any or all Of the property described hereinabove. 
Signature of Trustors: 
Pacific Nakon&temadonal. Inc., 
a Nevada coloration 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
Kqne* in. 
CQUNTY0F€A)b1HbAKB ) 
On The J ~ ^ day of J t a c A l , personally append tefore me , U ^ r j f e ' . l ^ ^ 
cfFaaifioNakoo bmnfitiOtvalBlD^ aNovad^carporati^ a aad that the withkiand tfaa forgoing fostrumcat 
ww J%Md o& baWf of a aid corporation V *** wibotlfc- of a resolution of iti bo wd of directors and $*dd 
1-4 Maf ^Ten^^in duly aafcxr hedged to ma that wid corporation executed thi 
lartvfi. 
'*«*"• 
^ < fnry P J 
' >l N I) hi 






My <, omrmssion r> 
Augubt H 
biule ct \ 




Notary Public ' / , / * 
My Commiwion Expixw; Q/ /*£/ £(p^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OEJAfc^tAKE* 
Oi tbaX M 
) 
at. 
• y M A / Theodore- 9 $<ic<t 
day ofJwa^OOl* personalty appowed bafbrt a e / / ) fc ^  rl^F^e^ j whobiliigfry ma duly sworndid say that hg ia fh& rre< J At>\>x \T of 
Boca Entarpriaoi, Inc., a Utah corpoiation and that tba within rod "66 £brgDifi$ instrument to slgnsd on 
Wudf ojf **id c<^iikon by its authority of a resolution of its board of director* end «*id 
Theodore. <^ r £c?dd< duly adauroladgad to m*thataald corporation SKsautedthe some. 
JOHN 0 m LM-* 
br> Cast Main r l i r o l 
Ordorville U| c -4 / ' ri 
M, Commission ( >};no<* 
Augt"5l U r'OOi 
* nil a of U* th 
N^r/PuS Liw / / 
My Commteton Expiks: X//</•;/2<?>Q-1 
AiNptcifictoLwpd 
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